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I.

INTRODUCTION

After a long renovation process, your house is finally ready.
Unfortunately, several weeks after its completion you, notice water leaking
from the second floor, and a few days later a pipe bursts damaging a large
portion of the house. As a legally informed homeowner, you sue the
contractor for damages and repair costs. The court rules in your favor,
declaring that the contractor’s services were negligently performed. You hire
a new contractor.
This example captures how people think about their legal options in
these situations. In many cases, the sued party will rely on her insurance
company for coverage against the claim. Assuming the contractor attempted
to do her best work, but for a variety of reasons fell short, should her
negligence be covered? Most people would answer in the affirmative. What
if the contractor intentionally damaged the homeowner’s plumbing? Most
people would agree the insurance company should not bear the cost of the
contractor’s intentional infliction of harm. However, what if the contractor
intentionally used cheap materials knowing this choice would increase her
profits but also increase the leakage probability? In this case, the answer is
less clear.
Courts have struggled to determine under what circumstances the
injured, such as the contractor, should be covered and when her actions
forfeit coverage.1 This determination is governed, inter alia, by the
“expected or intended harm clause,” a liability insurance policy provision
that excludes coverage for expected or intended harm. 2 Courts in different
jurisdictions vary in their interpretation of this clause ranging from a broad
construction that any expectation of harm bars coverage to a narrow one
where only the intention to inflict harm bars recovery. Wausau Underwriters
Ins. Co. v. United Plastics Grp., Inc.,3 highlights this difference. In this case,
the insured, United Plastic Group Inc. (UPG), manufactured a defective part
1

See FISCHER, WIDISS & KEETON, infra note 53 at 435–37. See also the
relevant discussion in Section III.C.1.
2
See FISCHER, WIDISS & KEETON, infra note 53 at 421–24. See also the
relevant discussion in Section III.
3
Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co. v. United Plastics Grp., Inc., 512 F.3d
953 (7th Cir. 2008).
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for its water heaters by using a significantly lower molding temperature. As
a result, the water heaters ruptured in customers’ homes causing $26.5
million in property damage. In its opinion, the court noted: “[s]uppose UPG
thought that 0.1 percent of the heaters would fail; instead 15 percent did. Is
the difference in magnitude enough to show that the harm to the customers
that occurred was ‘expected’?”4
To answer this question, we must look to how jurisdictions construe
the expected or intended harm clause because this choice affects injurer
behavior. The central difficulty is defining “expected” harm, which can lead
to over- and under-inclusive outcomes—an unfavorable result. In response,
injurers and insurance companies may alter their actions to avoid exposure
to liability. As one court described this relationship:
[B]oth [the] insured and insurer have an incentive, at the contracting
stage, to rule out [expected or intended harm]. If a policy allows
recovery for discharges that expectedly or intentionally generate
liability, policyholders will be tempted (at the margin) to engage in
harm-generating (or reckless) behavior, i.e., will be subject to ‘moral
hazard.’ To the extent that the moral hazard is not constrained, total
compensable losses will be increased by a number of reasonably
avoidable losses, and premiums, of course, will rise with them.5
This Article provides a novel analysis of the incentives created by
different interpretations of the expected or intended harm clause. Moreover,
this interpretive decision has ramifications on the insurance system. Given
the connection between courts’ interpretative decisions, party incentives, and
the insurance industry, this Article recommends that courts look to the
injurer’s efforts to comply with the standard of care to distinguish
unintentional behavior from intentional negligent risk-taking. To achieve
this aim, this Article suggests that courts should employ a “best effort”
defense, which removes liability if the injurer can prove she exercised her
best efforts to comply with the standard of care. This approach differs from
previous doctrines and scholarship because it subjectively evaluates the
injurer based on personalized information now available through
technological advancements. With more information available during the
underwriting process, insurers can create tailored standards of care for their
policyholders. Courts can then use this personalized rubric to more
4

Id. at 961.
Charter Oil Co. v. Am. Employers' Ins. Co., 69 F.3d 1160, 1166 (D.C.
Cir. 1995).
5
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accurately measure the injurer’s ex post behavior. This article will examine
the benefits of the advanced underwriting process and its mechanics,
including information acquisition and burdens of proof. The result is a
personalized insurance policy that can provide more favorable outcomes in
insurance coverage disputes.
Part II of this Article will summarize the three categories of
negligent behavior—intentional infliction of harm, intentional negligent
risk-taking, and unintentional non-compliance—any one of which may be
implicated in an insurance dispute. Part III will review the expected or
intended harm clause and how courts have decided to interpret it. From these
observations, we can trace how current legal doctrine may result in flawed
applications of this clause which negatively impacts insurer and injurer
incentives. Part IV offers a new way of looking at this problem by
introducing the “best efforts” defense to safeguard policyholders against
imperfect applications of the expected or intended harm clause exclusion.
This section will elaborate on how and why this defense is feasible in today’s
legal system. Finally, Part V concludes this discussion.
II.

NON-COMPLIANCE

Liability insurance disputes often begin with a compensable harm to
a third party. In most cases, either negligence or strict liability will determine
whether the defendant’s harm, caused by the injurer, is legally compensable.6
Harm is legally compensable when the injurer fails to comply with the
appropriate liability regime.7 For strict liability, harm is compensable
regardless of whether the injurer took precautions.8 Under a negligence
regime, harm is compensable if the injurer failed to take legally mandated
precautions.9 Non-compliance—the failure to take legally mandated
precautions—materializes for a variety of reasons. Distinguishing between
6

Although the scope of this article focuses on harm caused by
negligence, further scholarship can apply this discussion to other liability
regimes. Regardless of the governing liability rule, harm is legally
compensable when the injurer caused it while failing to comply with the
standard of care.
7
KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW
188 (4th ed. 2012) (“[S]trict liability is in effect activity-based, whereas
negligence liability is act-based”).
8
Id.
9
Id. at 51–52.
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them is noteworthy for two reasons. First, insurance policies often determine
coverage based on the type of non-compliance. There are two types of noncompliance: (1) expected or intended (intentional non-compliance) and (2)
inadvertent (unintentional non-compliance).10 The expected or intended
harm clause explicitly bars coverage for the first category, while coverage
for the latter depends on how courts interpret this clause. Since these
categories inform the scope of insurance, any mechanism that enhances our
ability to distinguish between them will strengthen injurers’ confidence in
their level of coverage. Second, and perhaps more importantly, organizing
non-compliance into these two categories allows scholars to quantify when
courts misclassify the harm. This observation is important to gauge how
consistently courts can accurately identify non-compliance type, which
directly impacts coverage. Before examining non-compliance under the
negligence standard, we will briefly review the standard of care under this
liability regime.
A.

UNDERSTANDING THE LEGAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Negligence is the failure to exercise reasonable care that causes
compensable harm.11 In order to assess whether an individual acted
negligently, the court must engage in a two-step analysis. First, the court
must define “reasonable care,” a standard derived from asking what a
reasonably prudent person would do in the same situation.12 The court may
adjust the standard after evaluating evidence so that the level of care is
sensitive to the case’s particular circumstances.13 Second, the court measures
the defendant’s behavior against this standard.14 Failure to comply with this
standard informs the finding of liability.
Different schools of thought articulate various rationales for why
individuals do or do not comply with the standard of care. Under an
economic analysis of tort law,15 compliance depends on how much the
10

See discussion infra Section III.C.
MARK A. GEISTFELD, TORT LAW: ESSENTIALS 51; KENNETH S.
ABRAHAM, supra note 7 at 58-59; RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 109–10
(1999).
12
Kenneth S. Abraham, The Trouble with Negligence, 54 VAND. L.
REV. 1187, 1190–91 (2001).
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
For the purpose of this Essay an in-depth analysis of victims'
11
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defendant internalizes the accident costs. The more an injurer internalizes
the cost of her harm, the more likely she is to comply with the standard of
care. In this way, tort law aims to achieve efficient incentives by pricing noncompliance appropriately. To elaborate, both victims and injurers take
efficient precaution when negligent behavior costs more than complying
with the standard of care. Negligence law creates efficient compliance
incentives when the standard of care is aligned with the efficient
precaution.16 We can achieve this outcome by reconceptualizing the Hand
Formula17 into marginal terms where a defendant is negligent when the
marginal cost of increasing her precaution is lower than the benefit gained
from reducing the expected harm.18 Put differently, negligence law requires
the injurer to take all efficient precautions.19
Although this theoretical account explains injurers’ incentives to
comply with the standard of care, non-compliance frequently occurs.
Evaluating these cases provide limited explanation of non-compliance
because individuals fail to conform with the standard of care for a variety of
reasons. The following section explores these explanations.
B.

INTENTIONAL NON-COMPLIANCE

Why do rational injurers knowingly and intentionally fail to comply
with the standard of care? An injurer may fail to meet the standard of care
because she enjoys inflicting harm on the victim or, alternatively, because
she does not fully internalize the magnitude of her harm. Most would agree
that the former injurer should receive harsher treatment than the former given
the harm’s intentional nature. As such, it is important to differentiate
between intentional infliction of harm (when the injurer intends to harm the
precautions is unnecessary as we focus on the injurer interaction with its
insurance, however, it is important to note that any comprehensive economic
analysis of tort law will require incentivizing both injurers and victims to
behave efficiently.
16
ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 205–06 (6th
ed. 2012).
17
U.S. v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173–74 (2d Cir. 1947).
18
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 16, at 213–15.
19
Mark F. Grady, A New Positive Economic Theory of Negligence, 92
YALE L.J. 799 (1983); Mark F. Grady, Untaken Precautions, 18 J. LEG.
STUD. 139 (1989).
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victim) and intentional negligent risk-taking (when the injurer engages in
risky behavior, but does not intend to cause harm).
1. Intentional Infliction of Harm
Some injurers intend for their behavior to cause harm. This article
refers to such injuries as “intentional infliction of harm” where the injurer’s
activity is aimed at causing harm. Most criminal activity falls within this
category. Moreover, these intentional cases differ from calculated risk or
gross negligence because of the injurer’s deliberateness. In economic
terms,20 the intentional injurer generates some value or enjoyment from
harming the victim.21 In these cases, the defendant takes no precaution to
prevent the accident but purposefully acts to increase its probability.22
2. Intentional Risk-taking
Unlike intentional infliction of harm, an injurer’s negligent conduct
can also be characterized as “intentional negligent risk-taking,” where the
injurer engages in risky behavior that violates the standard of care but does
not explicitly intend to cause harm. Put differently, the injurer’s activity may
foreseeably harm the victim, but such harm is not the objective. The
20

RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 239–45 (9th ed.
2014); THOMAS J. MICELI, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 74–75
(2004); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 149–60 (1987); COOTER & ULEN, supra note 11,
at 188 (classifying intentional torts as a criminal activity); William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of Intentional Torts, 1
INT. REV. L. ECON. 127, 127–39 (1981).
21
In his discussions of the economic analysis of torts, Shavell does not
cover intentional in the accident law analysis. See STEVEN SHAVELL,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 1 (1987) [hereinafter:
ACCIDENT LAW]; STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1st
ed. 2004) (ignoring intentional torts in his analysis); STEVEN SHAVELL,
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2004) (ignoring
intentional torts in his analysis). One can infer, according to Shavell and also
intuitively, that intentional torts are not accidents.
22
As a matter of fact, when an injurer intentionally inflicts harm, the
precaution cost becomes negative when stated in the terms of the Hand
Formula. The injurer does not invest in avoiding the harm, but instead invests
her energy in harming the victim.
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relationship between shareholders and management provides an example. A
CEO may participate in high-risk corporate activity without meaning to harm
her shareholders; nonetheless, this activity may ultimately reduce the
shareholders’ assets.
Injurers may become intentionally negligent risk-takers for several
reasons. First, some injurers enjoy risk-taking because it generates a dangerinduced exhilaration rooted in the potential for harm rather than a victim’s
suffering. We can think of street racing as an example where drivers are
attracted to the high-risk environment, rather than a desire to hit pedestrians
or other vehicles. Likewise, injurers may take risks to achieve a competitive
edge. This can be seen when cheerleaders hope to elevate their performances
with difficult stunts, individuals pursue high-stakes gambling, or CEOs
engage in highly leveraged investments. In these examples, risky activity
attracts ambitious individuals because it can generate considerable rewards
and profits.
In addition to an injurer’s preference for risky activity, negligent
risk-taking can also occur because of imperfections in the legal system. Such
deficiencies are problematic because they prevent injurers from fully
internalizing their accident costs. Several institutional factors explain this
externalization, which as noted above, increases the likelihood of noncompliance. First, there may be judicial mistakes in setting liability. When
courts systematically set the standard of care too low, the injurer is
incentivized to align her level of care with the court’s lowered standard.23
Second, inaccurately computed damages can also lead to distorted party
incentives. When courts consistently undervalue harm, the injurer is
incentivized to lower her precautions since she will not be responsible for
the total accident costs.24 Third, collective action problems motivate injurers

23

Steven Shavell, Liability for Accidents, 1 HANDBOOK OF L. ECON.
139, 160-161 (2007); Mitchell A. Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive
Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 892 (1997);
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 11, at 220–22.
24
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 11, at 257–61; Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages, 39 J.L. ECON. 191 (1996);
Ariel Porat, Misalignments in Tort Law, 121 YALE L.J. 82, 135–36 (2011);
SHAVELL, supra note 16, at 165; Yehonatan Shiman, Reasonably Subjective
& Subjectively Reasonable: Examining Subjectivity in Negligence: Victims,
Injurers, & Courts 8–51 (May 2018) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Virginia School of Law) (on file with author). (Pages 8-51).
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to lower their precautions25 because victims may not litigate harms when
costs exceed the recovery.26 Fourth, an injurer can be “judgment-proof”
meaning she cannot practically be accountable because she cannot
compensate the victim. The judgment-proof defendant’s27 resources limit her
expected costs28 thereby allowing her to engage in tortious behavior when
the expected benefits exceed these potential costs.29
Finally, injurers benefit when courts ignore excessive victim
precautions in calculating liability or damages, even though these behaviors
lower the accident’s probability.30 When victims take excessive precaution
to safeguard against harm, their action reduces the accident costs below the
25

Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J.
LEG. STUD. 357 (1984); COOTER & ULEN, supra note 11, at 257–61.
26
David Gilo, Ehud Guttel & Erez Yuval, Negligence, Strict Liability,
and Collective Action, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 69, 70 (2013); MANCUR
OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION; PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (Harvard Univ. Press 2nd ed. 1971);
William B. Rubenstein, Why Enable Litigation: A Positive Externalities
Theory of the Small Claims Class Action, 74 UMKC L. REV. 709, 712
(2006).
27
Steven Shavell, The Social Versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit
in a Costly Legal System, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 333 (1982); Steven Shavell,
The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 45 (1986).
28
Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L. J. 1 (1996).
29
Amanda Edwards, Medical Malpractice Non-Economic Damages
Caps, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 213, 217 (2006); David A. Hyman et al.,
Estimating the Effect of Damages Caps in Medical Malpractice Cases:
Evidence from Texas, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 355 (2009); Greg Pogarsky &
Linda Babcock, Damages Caps, Motivated Anchoring, and Bargaining
Impasse, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 143, 146 (2001); Catherine M. Sharkey,
Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice Damages Caps, 80
N.Y.U. L. REV. 391, 402 (2005).
30
Scholars have examined how precaution levels can affect the total
accident cost such as how one party’s precaution costs may change the other
party’s precaution costs. See Dhammika Dharmapala & Sandra A.
Hoffmann, Bilateral Accidents with Intrinsically Interdependent Costs of
Precaution, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 239, 246 (2005). See also Alan J. Meese, The
Externality of Victim Care, 68 CHICAGO. L. REV. 1201, 1211–15 (2001)
(Alternatively, precaution costs can affect the total accident costs when the
injurer fails to internalize the victim’s precaution costs).
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cost of precaution.31 As victims take more precautions, an accident is less
likely to materialize, thus reducing the injurer’s internalized accident costs.
Such scenarios arise when victims protect items with high subjective value.32
Items are highly valued when they are irreplaceable, or when the law does
not provide full recovery. Taken together, these institutional reasons
illustrate why injurers may engage in intentional risk-taking since they will
not internalize the full cost of their harm.
C.

UNINTENTIONAL NON-COMPLIANCE

In addition to intentional risk-taking, courts can also find injurers
negligent for “unintentional non-compliance,” episodes where the injurer
tried to comply with the standard of care but failed.33 Various features in
negligence law contribute to unintentional non-compliance, including an
unreachable standard of care,34 unintentional lapses of attention,35 and the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine.36 The following sections examine these cases.
1. The Objective Standard
As noted above, tort law establishes an objective standard of care
based on the reasonably prudent person.37 This reasonable person standard
31

Shiman, supra note 24.
Shiman, supra note 24.
33
Abraham, supra note 6; Mark F. Grady, Res Ipsa Loquitor and
Compliance Error, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 887 (1994); Robert Cooter & Ariel
Porat, Lapses of Attention in Medical Malpractice and Road Accidents, 15
THEOR. INQ. L. 329 (2014); Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat, Personalizing
Negligence Law, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 627 (2016).
34
Kenneth S. Abraham, Strict Liability in Negligence, 61 DEPAUL L.
REV. 271 (2011); Ben-Shahar & Porat, supra note 33.
35
Grady, supra note 33; Cooter & Porat, supra note 33; Abraham, supra
note 34.
36
Grady, supra note 33.
37
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL &
EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 (AM. LAW INST. 2010). Other elements that
determine liability are also evaluated from an objective perspective. For
example, the foreseeability of the accident is determined objectively rather
than subjectively. The question for the jury is not whether the defendant
foresaw the plaintiff, but rather whether the defendant should have foreseen
the plaintiff and the risk of the accident.
32
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does not consider a defendant’s specific capabilities38 thereby leading to
circumstances where the standard is too low for some injurers and too high
for others.39 While this misalignment does not disadvantage injurers in the
former category, its impact can be substantial for the latter. Unintentional
non-compliance results when injurers cannot achieve the reasonable person
standard. For example, a physician is still expected to act like a “reasonable
practitioner” even if she lacks some knowledge or skill to satisfy this
standard in a particular circumstance.40 As such, the objective standard
condemns injurers who experience capacity limitations that fall below the
reasonable person’s abilities. Non-compliance with the standard of care can
result from physical, mental, or emotional constraints.
2. Perfect Compliance
Unintentional non-compliance can also occur when the court
expects conformity with the standard of care in every instance. Liability
occurs under a “perfect compliance” regime when injurers cannot meet this
rigorous requirement41 due to random errors or lapses.42 Individuals are
prone to lapses either from limited capacity, attention span, or multi-tasking
over extended periods of time. For example, Amy may be an excellent driver
who generally takes precautions yet causes an accident in the few seconds
she glances at her speedometer. Thus, even cautious drivers can negligently
cause an accident because of a lapse.43 As such, demand for perfect
38

Abraham, supra note 33, at 283. There are a few limited exceptions to
this rule, including when courts allow evidence of limited capacity to be
presented. See Ben-Shahar & Porat, supra note 33, at 637–41; ABRAHAM,
supra note 7, at 64–67.
39
Ben-Shahar & Porat, supra note 33.
40
Note however that asymmetry exists when a high level of skill or
knowledge may raise the required precaution by the defendant.
41
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic
Theory of Tort, 15 GA. LAW REV. 851, 880 (1980).
42
Id.at 879–80; Grady, supra note 33, at 894–906; Abraham, supra note
34, at 288–89.
43
Peter A. Diamond, Single Activity Accidents, 3 J. LEG. STUD. 107,
123–25 (1974). We can think about compliance error as the distinction
between two orders of negligence. See Cooter & Porat, supra note 33, at
330–31. The first order is the decision itself, such as driving at the speed
limit. The second order is the attempt to maintain a precise precaution within
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compliance with the standard of care is another example of unintentional
non-compliance.
3. Res Ipsa Loquitur – The Presumption of Negligence
Finally, unintentional non-compliance can emerge from res ipsa
loquitur (“the thing speaks for itself”), which assigns liability when the
defendant’s negligence is the likely consequence of the harm, even if it
cannot be proven.44 To illustrate, if a driver and a pedestrian collide, res ipsa
loquitur presumes the former was the faulty party. The court can invoke res
ipsa loquitur when the following conditions are fulfilled: (1) the accident is
typically caused by a common type of defendant, (2) the defendant assumed
full control of the instrument that caused the accident, and (3) the injury does
not result from the plaintiff’s voluntary action or contributory behavior.45
Unlike compliance errors and limited capacity, res ipsa loquitur
enables defendants to be found negligent due to an overriding presumption
even when they perfectly comply with the legal standard. From the
defendant’s perspective, res ipsa loquitur essentially creates a version of
strict liability46 by casting liability without finding legal fault as traditionally
defined.47 This outcome leads injurers to internalize error costs. Error costs
are instances where, courts find injurers liable despite compliance because
of the negligence presumption. Error costs, therefore, provide another reason
why injurers need insurance to cover unintentional non-compliance
episodes.

the first order, such as maintaining a precise speed limit. Similarly, the
goalkeeper’s decision to jump right is a first order decision, and the quality
of his attempt to block the ball is a second order decision.
44
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL &
EMOTIONAL HARM § 17.
45
ABRAHAM, supra note 7, at 107.
46
Grady, supra note 33, at 892–94; GEISTFELD, supra note 11, at 237–
38.
47
ARIEL PORAT & ALEX STEIN, TORT LIABILITY UNDER UNCERTAINTY
95–97 (2001); Stephen G. Gilles, Negligence, Strict Liability, and the
Cheapest Cost-Avoider, 78 VA. L. REV. 1291, 1303–13 (1992).
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4. Bad Moral Luck
Unintentional non-compliance occurs when an injurer cannot meet
the objective standard, fails to exercise perfect compliance, or is presumed
negligent under res ipsa loquitor. These factors all involve circumstances
where compliance is beyond the injurer’s physical control, making noncompliance an involuntary behavior. When an injurer’s uncontrollable
moments of non-compliance cause harm, we can conceptualize this
condition as “bad moral luck.”48
To demonstrate, a driver following the speed limit may nonetheless
accelerate when she drives downhill. She will suffer “bad moral luck” if a
pedestrian crosses her path at the exact moment she deviates from the
standard of care. Thus, “bad moral luck” occurs when the injurer causes harm
during her period of unintentional non-compliance.49 Conversely, injurers
experience “good moral luck” when their non-compliance does not trigger
any harmful consequences.
III.

THE EXPECTED OR INTENDED HARM CLAUSE

Given the possibility of bad moral luck, the expected or intended
harm clause gives courts a tool to assign different protections to
unintentional non-compliance and intentional negligent risk-taking. When
harm is expected or intended, courts can use this contractual clause to bar

48

This article refers to bad moral luck in the sense of compliance luck
and the personal characteristics of the injurer. This formulation mirrors the
natural lottery concept. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 101 (1971).
Another type of moral luck, which is not discussed in this article, is casual
moral luck. For a discussion of this manifestation of moral luck see generally
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Justice and Bad Luck, in THE STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 1 (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2014),
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/justice-bad-luck/ (last
visited May 9, 2017); John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort
Law and Moral Luck, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1123, 1143–49 (2006). OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 108 (Revised ed. 1991); Jeremy
Waldron, Moments of Carelessness and Massive Loss, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 387, 387–88 (David G. Owen ed., 1995).
49
Tom Baker, Liability Insurance, Moral Luck, and Auto Accidents
Moral and Legal Luck, 9 THEOR. INQ. L. 165, 168 (2008).
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coverage.50 Conversely, courts can find that unintentional non-compliance
does not forfeit insurance protection.51
A.

DISTINGUISHING NON-COMPLIANCE IN INSURANCE POLICIES

Insurance is a contract between two parties in which the injurer
transfers her risk to an insurance company for a premium. Examples of
liability insurance include automobile, commercial liability, homeowner,
and renter insurance policies. In many cases, an insurance company requires
its policyholder to conform to certain safety measures in order to maintain
coverage or price. For example, homeowner insurers offer discounts when
policyholders install smoke detectors.52 By dictating the coverage terms, the
insurance company monitors individuals to ensure they take appropriate

50

FISCHER, WIDISS & KEETON, infra note 53, at 424–26 (reviewing
various judicial different “approaches to assessing whether liability coverage
exists for a consequences that the tortfeasor allegedly did not intend”).
51
FISCHER, WIDISS & KEETON, infra note 53, at 424–25 (the second
approach presented by the authors). See also infra notes 76–78 and
accompanying text.
52
Ben-Shahar & Logue, Outsourcing regulation, infra note 53, at 224.
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safety measures.53 Thus, liability insurance serves as a safety regulator.54
Insurance plays a pivotal role in the American tort system55 and thus
merits attention for any understanding of injurer incentives. A quantitative
study showed that in 2010 liability insurance was the greatest cost associated
with tort cases ($172.9 billion) while self-insurance56 accounted for a smaller
amount ($61.9 billion).57 Another study showed that plaintiff attorneys
typically sue defendants for their insurance policy limits rather than for their
personal assets’ value.58 As such, an insurance policy’s scope and
53

JAMES M. FISCHER, ALAN I. WIDISS & ROBERT E. KEETON,
INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL
DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES 463–65 (2nd ed. 2016); Kenneth
S. Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 161 PA. L. REV. 653, 683–91
(2012); Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How
Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard, [hereinafter: Outsourcing regulation] 111
MICH. L. REV. 197 (2012); Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, How
Insurance Substitutes for Regulation, 36 REGULATION 36 (2013)
[hereinafter: How Insurance Substitutes for Regulation]. Tom Baker,
Liability Insurance as Tort Regulation: Six Ways That Liability Insurance
Shapes Tort Law in Action, 12 CONN. INSUR. LAW J. 1–16 (2005); but see
Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate
Governance: The Directors’ & (and) Officers’ Liability Insurer, 95 GEO L.
J. 1795 (2006); Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate
Governance Risk: Evidence from the Directors’ & (and) Officers’ Liability
Insurance Market, 74 CHIC. L. REV. 487 (2007).
54
Abraham, supra note 53, at 683–91; Ben-Shahar & Logue, How
Insurance Substitutes for Regulation, supra note 53; Ben-Shahar & Logue,
Outsourcing regulation, supra note 53.
55
Baker, supra note 53; Kathryn Zeller et al., Physicians’ Insurance
Limits and Malpractice Payments: Evidence from Texas Closed Claims,
1990-2003 Current Research on Medical Malpractice Liability, 36 J. LEG.
STUD. S9–S46 (2007); see e.g. Ellen S. Pryor, Stories We Tell: Intentional
Harm and the Quest for Insurance Funding, 75 TEX. L. REV. 172 (1996)
(arguing that the plaintiff can engage in strategic pleading based on the
policy’s exclusions).
56
This includes high deductibles and captive insurance programs.
TOWERS WATSON, U.S. TORT COST TRENDS – 2011 UPDATE 10 (2012).
57
Id. at 14.
58
Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of
Tort Law in Action, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 275, 281 (2001). (“[I]f the
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limitations, particularly liability insurance, has rippling effects for injurer
behavior and tort litigation.59
Central to this structure is how insurance companies differentiate
coverage between intentionally inflicted harm, intentional negligent risktaking, and unintentional non-compliance. Insurers, policyholders, and
society all benefit when coverage includes unintentional non-compliance but
rejects the former two categories. A fairness argument supports this
distinction: it seems improper to bar coverage for injurers who purchase
insurance to protect against unintentionally caused harm. Policyholders
obtain insurance because they seek coverage for unintentional noncompliance, including uncontrollable accidents that cause substantial harm.
In contractual terms, obtaining coverage for unintentional behavior is within
the injurer’s reasonable expectation. By contrast, denying coverage for
intentional negligent risk-taking makes sense since this approach eliminates
moral hazard problems that would emerge if insurance companies subsidized
intentional risk-taking. Once again, an injurer who intentionally engages in
risk-taking may expect her coverage to be challenged if her deliberate
intentions are revealed.
Another important consideration is efficiency. Unintentionally noncompliant policyholders pose an ordinary risk on average since they
consistently attempt to meet the standard of care but occasionally fall short.
This description captures all individuals since human error prevents perfect
compliance. Assuming unintentional non-compliance is random, then under
a normal distribution all policyholders impose the same risk on average.
Therefore, unintentional non-compliance operates within the ordinary
insurance framework in which harm results from lapses or limited capacity,
not from a lack of precaution. In this way, allowing coverage for
unintentional non-compliance will not distort injurer incentives since the
policyholder continues to internalize her accident costs as she tries to comply
with the standard of care. The same cannot be said for intentional negligent
risk-taking. When insurance covers intentional negligent risk-taking, the
injurer externalizes some of the accident costs to her insurer, leading to a
moral hazard problem. With the insurance company subsidizing her
negligent risk-taking, the injurer will continue to take inefficient precautions
against potential harms.
Efficiency also demands barring coverage for intentional negligent
risk-taking because this conduct raises costs to insurers and other
respondents are accurate, plaintiffs prefer not to purse blood money in an
ordinary negligence case”).
59
ABRAHAM, supra note 7, at 281–83.
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policyholders. For unintentional non-compliance, an insurer can balance
high-risk activity through its policy terms or the average risk pool. Once
insurers agree to cover individuals with a high-lapse potential, they can
mitigate their risk by adjusting ratings, increasing deductibles and requesting
higher premiums. Conversely, intentional negligent risk-taking is more
challenging to assess during the underwriting process because policyholders
will not disclose their intentions.60 As a result, insurers cannot discriminately
impose stricter coverage terms for these individuals since they cannot
accurately identify them. Moral hazard also increases the risk pool because
intentional risk takers transfer the costs of their risk-taking to other compliant
policyholders in the pool.61
Following these assumptions about insurers and injurers, there is
both a need and a benefit to policies differentiating between types of noncompliance. The expected or intended harm clause seeks to provide this
needed filter.
B.

EXCLUDING COVERAGE FOR EXPECTED OR INTENDED HARM

Commercial General Liability (CGL) is “the first line of coverage
that businesses in [the United Sates] use to insure against liability.”62 A
standard CGL insurance policy provides coverage for bodily injury or
property damages that result from “an occurrence.”63 An insurance policy
60

We can also ask whether individuals who have a high tendency of
lapsing will disclose this information during the underwriting process.
Intuitively, it seems unlikely because this honesty will lead to higher
premiums. Therefore, as will be discussed further in Section III.C.2, injurers
who know and do not disclose their high-lapsing behavior, essentially
engage in intentional negligent risk taking. To see why, recall that the
intentional risk taker chooses her activity because she can externalize the
harm to the insurer and only bears the premium costs. In a similar manner,
the injurer who suffers from high-lapses and uses insurance to mitigate her
exposure to the risk is intentionally negligent. Absent her insurance, this
individual would not have engaged in the same activity.
61
See Charter Oil Co. v. Am. Emp’rs Ins. Co., 69 F.3d 1160, 1166 (D.C.
Cir. 1995) (arguing to a similar effect).
62
Kenneth S. Abraham, The Rise and Fall of Commercial Liability
Insurance, 87 Va. L. Rev. 85, 85 (2001).
63
INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY –
COVERAGE FORM CG 00 01 04 13, at 1 (2012) [hereinafter COMMERCIAL
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generally defines occurrence as “an accident, including continuous or
repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.”64
Through its broad scope, this language accounts for harm caused by sudden
and unexpected events as well as harm caused by a slow and gradual injury.65
It is important to note that the policy leaves “accident” undefined despite
using the term six additional times.66 Although a definition is not clearly
provided, “accident” can be inferred to encompass an event that is neither
expected nor intended. This presumed meaning is grounded in the fact that
insurance policies explicitly exclude expected or intended harm, noting that
coverage does not apply to “[b]odily injury or property damage expected or
intended from the standpoint of the insured.”67
By contractually excluding expected or intended harm, insurance
policies cabin the type of risk an individual can transfer to her insurer.68 By
limiting coverage to unanticipated harm, the injurer bears the costs for any
“expected” or “intended” accident. This responsibility differs from universal
coverage, which would enable injurers to externalize all their costs for noncompliance. Determining when an accident is “expected” or “intended”
presents a difficult inquiry that courts approach differently. This varied
GENERAL LIABILITY].
64
Id. at 15.
65
FISCHER, WIDISS & KEETON, supra note 53, at 422 (internal
quotations omitted).
66
COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY supra note 63; See, e.g.,
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. CTC Dev. Corp., 720 So. 2d 1072, 1075 (Fla.
1998) (discussing the definition of accident).
67
COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY, supra note 63, at 2. Other
insurance policies that provide liability insurance, such as homeowners and
renters insurance also contain a similar expected and intended exclusion. See,
e.g., INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, HOMEOWNERS 3 – SPECIAL FORM - HO
00 03 10 00 (1999).
68
For example, exclusions such as “Knowing Violation of Rights of
Another,” “Material Published With Knowledge of Falsity,” “Criminal
Acts,” “Contractual Liability,” “Quality or Performance of Goods – Failure
to Conform to Statements,” “Wrong Description of Prices,” and
“Infringement of Copyright, Patent, Trademark or Trade Secret” attempt to
mitigate the insurance company’s exposure to intentional negligent risktaking by the insured that would be transferred to the insurance company.
See COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY, supra note 63, at Coverage BExclusions.
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response is problematic because it can lead to inconsistent outcomes. The
subsequent section discusses these challenges in judicial interpretation.
C.

AN IMPERFECT INTERPRETATION

Some jurisdictions interpret the expected or intended clause to cover
only intentionally inflicted harm. As one court articulated in Snyder v.
Nelson, “it is against public policy for a tortfeasor to insure against liability
for intentionally inflicted injury or damage.” 69 Under this approach, both
intentional negligent risk-taking and unintentional non-compliance receive
insurance coverage. However, measuring intentions is difficult with the line
between intentional infliction of harm and intentionally negligent risk-taking
often blurred.
Should coverage forfeiture be limited to intentionally inflicted harm
or should intentional negligent risk-taking also be barred? One might assume
that the shared ‘intentional’ element leads to an affirmative answer.
However, intentional risk-taking is also aligned with unintentional noncompliance in that both behaviors have similar outcomes: their activities do
not intend the resulting harm. Given this commonality, it is not clear that
intentional negligent risk-taking is more like intentionally inflicting harm
than unintentional non-compliance. As such, courts should determine where
intentional risk-taking falls on the spectrum between intentional infliction of
harm, a socially unacceptable activity, and unintentional non-compliance, a
behavior deserving coverage. By using different “expected” harm
definitions, courts create coverage uncertainty for behavior falling outside
intentionally inflicted harm. Such unpredictability impacts injurer incentives
because there is a possibility she will be responsible for the total accident
cost.
An intuitive approach to “expected” harm is understanding it in
terms of tort law where “expected” often equates to “foreseeable.” When an
injurer anticipates her conduct will generate some likelihood of harm, then
coverage should be denied if such harm materializes. Most courts reject this
unforgiving approach as seen in Carter Lake v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.70:
[A]n injury is not caused by accident because the injury is
reasonably foreseeable would mean that only in a rare instance
would the comprehensive general liability policy be of any benefit
69
70

278 Or. 409, 564 P.2d 681 (1977).
604 F.2d 1052 (8th Cir. 1979).
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to [the defendant]. Enforcement of the policy in this manner would
afford such minimal coverage as to be patently disproportionate to
the premiums paid and would be inconsistent with the reasonable
expectations of an insured purchasing the policy.71
Instead, the court focused on the magnitude of the injurer’s risktaking and did not bar coverage simply because the harm was foreseeable.
The court elaborated:
[T]he word ‘expected’ denotes that the actor knew or should have
known that there was a substantial probability that certain
consequences will result from his actions. If the insured knew or
should have known that there was a substantial probability that
certain results would follow his acts or omissions then there has not
been an occurrence or accident as defined in this type of policy when
such results actually come to pass. The results cease to be expected
and coverage is present as the probability that the consequences will
follow decreases and becomes less than a substantial probability.72
In Carter Lake, the court offered a common construction for
“expected” harm where coverage is excluded if (1) the injurer had
knowledge that her conduct created a (2) substantial probability of harm.73
To satisfy the first prong, insurers must show that the injurer knew
(subjective) or should have known (objective) her actions risked harm.
Under the Carter Lake test, meeting either the subjective or objective
standard satisfies this prong. However, Carter Lake is not a universal
approach. Most jurisdictions employ similar prongs in their “expected” harm
analysis,74 but limit the first inquiry to a strictly subjective standard.75 For
71

Id. at 1058.
Id. at 1058–59.
73
See discussion infra Section III.C.2.
74
See, e.g., Johnson v. Am. United Life Ins. Co., 716 F.3d 813, 882-27
(4th Cir. 2013); Carney v. Vill. of Darien, 60 F.3d 1273, 1280 (7th Cir.
1995); Wickman v. Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co., 908 F.2d 1077, 1088 (1st Cir.1990);
Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan, Corp. v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 199
F. Supp. 3d 559, 594-96 (D. Conn. 2016); Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Waisanen, 653
F. Supp. 825, 830-31 (D.S.D. 1987).
75
U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Armstrong, 479 So. 2d 1164, 1167 (Ala.
1985) (“[T]he legal standard to determine whether the injury was either
72

2018

EXPECTED BAD MORAL LUCK

137

example, in Johnstown v. Bankers Standard Ins. Co.,76 the court found the
injurer forfeited recovery if she “intended the damages, or if it [could] be
said that the damages were, in a broader sense, ‘intended’ by the insured
because [she] knew that the damages would flow directly and immediately
from its intentional act.”77 Many courts adopt this narrower formulation of
the “expected” harm analysis.78 The following section discusses how a court’
decision to adopt the broad Carter Lake approach or the narrow Johnstown
approach impacts coverage for unintentional non-compliance and intentional
negligent risk-taking.
1. Assessing Subjective Expectation
Whether employing Carter Lake’s broad test or Johnstown’s narrow
one, courts must evaluate an injurer’s harm expectation. Two elements are
critical for an accurate analysis: (1) ascertaining the injurer’s knowledge, and
(2) measuring the quality of her knowledge.79 Both these inquires present
expected or intended . . . is a purely subjective standard.”); Fire Ins. Exch. v.
Berray, 694 P.2d 191, 194 (Ariz. 1984) (the legal standard should be “from
the standpoint of the insured”); Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Gaspard, 608 So. 2d
981, 985 (La. 1992) (“[T]he subjective intent of the insured is the key and
not what the average or ordinary reasonable person would expect or
intend.”); Shell Oil Co. v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 815,
861 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (rejecting the subjective “should have known” test).
76
877 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1989).
77
Id. at 1150 (internal citation omitted).
78
Westfield Ins. Co. v. Tech Dry In., 336 F.3d 503 (6th Cir. 2003);
Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178 (2d Cir.
1995); Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Safeway Steel Prods. Co., 743 S.W.2d
693 (Tex. App. 1987); Quaker State Mint-Lude, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins.
Co., 868 F. Supp. 1278 (D. Utah 1994).
79
Another challenge to a narrower subjective test is redundancy as the
policy language already excludes harm that is either expected or intended
through the Expected or Intended Harm Clause. Some courts have ruled that
insurance policy provisions should be interpreted so that every word has a
distinct meaning. See Galli v. Metz, 973 F.2d 145, 149 (2d Cir. 1992)
(applying N.Y. law); Bay State Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 451 N.E.2d 880, 882 (Ill.
1983); Klapp v. United Ins. Grp. Agency, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 447, 453 (Mich.
2003); Balandran v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 972 S.W.2d 738, 741 (Tex.
1998). If the test for expected harm is subjective intent, then the insurance
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hurdles for courts. Often it is unclear whether harm resulted from negligent
risk-taking or unintentional non-compliance. To illustrate, assume a
manufacturer disposes harmful waste knowing her improper disposal will
cause permanent contamination. If she disposes the waste improperly, is her
behavior a calculated risk or a human error despite aiming for perfect
compliance? When subjective intent is inferred from objective evidence (i.e.
improper waste disposal, or warnings about the potential of hazard),80 it is
almost impossible to determine if the manufacturer intended to take the risk
or whether she suffered from bad moral luck.
In these instances, the choice between using the Carter Lake test or
the Johnstown test determines the scope of coverage. Courts adopting the
Johnstown approach require the insured to prove the manufacturer knew
about the risk when she acted. Under this standard, unintentional noncompliance is covered because the manufacturer’s harm was neither
expected nor intended, but resulted from involuntary behavior. Conversely,
the broad Carter Lake approach requires proof that the manufacturer should
have known81 about the risk—a much lower evidentiary bar that can be
policy could have easily precluded intended harm. This contractual
interpretation is not necessarily as problematic as it may appear at first
glance. Having laid the foundations for how to distinguish between different
types of non-compliance in Part II, we can attribute the term “intended” to
“intentional infliction of harm” and the word “expected” to “intentional
negligent risk-taking.” Under this word association, unintentional noncompliance is inapplicable to either of these categories and remains covered
by the policy. Even once incorporating “intent” into the narrower subjective
test, this term may still have a unique and distinguishable meaning from
“intended harm.”
80
The court in Walnut Grove Partners., L.P. v. Am. Family Mut. Ins.
Co., 479 F.3d 949 (8th Cir. 2007) concluded that a notice of mold established
an expectation that harm would occur. In Carney, supra note 74, the court
ruled that prior allegations against officer misconduct established an
expectation by his employer.
81
Objective approach supports barring recovery, for example, for
blatantly foolish behavior, which is sometimes referred to as the “Damn Fool
Doctrine." FISCHER, WIDISS & KEETON, supra note 53, at 440–42;
Tenn. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Evans, 814 S.W.2d 49 (Tenn. 1991); Metro.
Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Buckner, 302 S.W.3d 288 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009).
The “Damn Fool” doctrine can be conceptualized as a variation of an
objective measure to establish subjective expectations regarding an
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inferred as a matter of law.82 With a reduced burden of proof, courts may
find the expected or intended harm clause excludes coverage for both
intentionally negligent risk-taking and unintentional non-compliance. As a
result, the court’s decision to evaluate “knowledge” under a subjective or
objective test impacts whether courts will find unintentional non-compliance
excluded from coverage. If devised broadly, a subjective test prohibits
coverage, whereas a narrow interpretation under perfect information allows
coverage for bad moral luck.
The second challenge in dealing with subjective intent is gauging the
precision of the injurer’s knowledge, i.e. how accurately did the injurer
anticipate the materialized harm. The injurer may forecast a specific harm
from her actions but a different harm actually occurs. For instance, the
manufacturer expects her improper waste disposal to pollute the soil, but it
unexpectedly expands to pollute the next town’s water reservoirs.
Additionally, the injurer may expect her actions to produce a certain
magnitude of harm; yet, the actualized harm is substantially greater. Again,
improper waste disposal may contaminate a larger area because of rain and
run-off. An injurer’s mistake in assessing her harm’s type and magnitude ex
ante complicates the question of whether it was “expected.” Courts must
determine whether these miscalculations negate an injurer’s expectation of
harm. The court’s choice of interpretive approach often informs this
outcome.
Under a broad Carter Lake test, an injurer’s harm miscalculation is
unimportant since liability can be found under an objective standard.
Because the resulting harm is measured against what a reasonable person
would have anticipated, the injurer’s error is irrelevant. As such, both
intentional negligent risk-taking and unintentional non-compliance will be
excluded from coverage under an objective standard so long as the
reasonable person could anticipate the harm’s magnitude and type.
Conversely, the narrower Johnstown test prioritizes the injurer’s predictions
as a critical factor in evaluating “expected” harm. This interpretation’s
advantage is that it covers unintentional non-compliance, which by nature
yields less anticipated harms since the objective is compliance with the
standard of care. However, the Johnstown approach can be over-inclusive
and sweep in intentional negligent risk-taking. If intentionally negligent risk-

individual’s intention to cause harm.
82
Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Harvey, 842 N.E.2d 1279 (Ind. 2006); Am.
Bumper & Mfg. Co. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 683 N.W.2d 161 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2004).
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takers cause harm that is different in-kind or proportion to their initial aims,
then by definition their harm was “unexpected”, and they receive coverage.
As seen through this discussion, the court’s interpretive approach
informs the scope of coverage. Whether the court decides to adopt a broad
objective test or a narrow subjective test results in comparable unintentional
non-compliance being excluded from coverage in some cases but not others.
By focusing on the injurer’s knowledge at the time of the accident, a narrow
subjective test under perfect information distinguishes unintentional noncompliance and intentional negligent risk-taking. Conversely, a broad
objective test cannot attain this same filtering and so excludes coverage for
the former behavior. While the narrow subjective test seems superior in
evaluating the extent of the injurer’s “knowledge” (whether she is or is not
aware of her activity’s possible harm), it is less apt at measuring the accuracy
of her knowledge (the certainty of her risk). Under a subjective test, any harm
that diverges from the injurer’s expectation is “unexpected.” Therefore, a
narrow subjective test allows coverage for intentional negligent risk-taking
when the actualized harm differs. For these reasons, assessing an injurer’s
harm expectation is important in the coverage analysis, but may lead to
imperfect outcomes in some instances.
2. Substantial Probability
In addition to determining “knowledge,” courts must also determine
the second prong in the “expected” harm subjective analysis: whether the
injurer’s conduct created a substantial probability of harm. To satisfy this
prong, the Carter Lake court, like many others,83 requires a substantial
probability that the injurer’s harm will materialize. While no court has
explicitly quantified the “substantial probability” threshold,84 we can assume
this test demands a higher likelihood than a 50-50% probability. Courts use
the “substantial probability” inquiry to gauge an injurer’s awareness
regarding the likelihood that her harm may occur. In other words, the answer
to this inquiry is articulated as a percentage—for instance, Amy is 60%
confident that her risk-taking could cause harm. The advantages of the
“substantial probability” approach are two-fold. First, it provides flexibility
83

Wickman v. Nw. Nat'l Ins. Co., 908 F.2d 1077 (1st Cir. 1990); Carney,
60 F.3d 1273; Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan, Corp. v. Interstate Fire
& Cas. Co., 199 F. Supp. 3d 559 (D. Conn. 2016); Honeycomb Sys., Inc. v.
Admiral Ins. Co., 567 F. Supp. 1400 (D. Me. 1983).
84
See all the above cases in this part, none defines substantial probability
numerically.
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to cover unintentional non-compliance since injurers aim for the standard of
care yet fail. Absent atypical situations, unintentionally non-compliant
injurers take precautions that are close to the legal standard so it is less likely
that their conduct will trigger a substantial probability of harm. Second, as a
supplement to the “knowledge” requirement, the “substantial probability”
inquiry also filters out intentional negligent risk-taking from coverage. If an
injurer knows her conduct will impose a high probability of risk, then such
harm is expected. To this extent, awareness of a risk’s substantial probability
necessarily implies knowledge and, therefore, cannot be unintentional.
Despite advantages in filtering injurer behavior, the “substantial
probability” probe also presents difficulties. First, it remains unclear what
percentage constitutes a “substantial probability,” with any determination
appearing arbitrary. Does the probability need to be a high threshold like
90% or is a number above 51% sufficient? Second, probability is hard to
precisely evaluate because of its speculative nature. Third, this test may
exclude beneficial behavior when there is a substantial probability of harm.
Fourth, and relatedly, the “substantial probability” test may also suspend
coverage for small-magnitude harm, while providing insurance for highmagnitude and costly harm as long as there is a low probability of
occurrence.
Although the “substantial probability” analysis seems to conflict
with the aims of the expected or intended harm clause, four important factors
mitigate these concerns: (1) injurer awareness of unintentional noncompliance; (2) specialty policies; (3) the common law of torts; and (4)
restorative efforts. Regarding the first element, when an injurer knows there
exists a substantial probability of her harm materializing, then pursuing this
activity reveals a deliberate and informed decision. A rational injurer will
only participate in an activity when the benefits outweigh the costs. The
possibility of losing coverage increases an activity’s cost, thereby making it
less likely that the injurer will externalize this cost to her insurer. When
injurers anticipate their small lapses could produce a substantial probability
of harm, then coverage forfeiture will dissuade them from engaging in the
activity. Given this effect, insurance policies can exclude injurer behavior
that generates a substantial probability of harm as compared to the average
policyholder pool even when such harm is unintended.85
This arrangement has merit because it mitigates adverse selection
and moral hazard problems.86 When the injurer knows she is likely to deviate
85
86

Baker, supra note 49.
W. Cas. & Sur. Co. v. W. World Ins. Co., Inc., 769 F.2d 381, 385 (7th
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significantly from the standard of care or her activity is dangerous, she can
exploit this information asymmetry by purchasing insurance and expecting
coverage. While some may challenge the assumption that injurers know their
own deviation frequencies and magnitudes, it is important to emphasize that
injurers are best positioned to acquire information about their own lapses.
Although injurers cannot predict their every non-compliance, they know the
risk of lapsing and should be incentivized to acquire this information.
Another factor that can provide coverage for unintentional noncompliance is a specialized insurance policy. This tool allows insurers to
pool injurers whose slight deviations generate a high probability of harm,
thus distributing the risk and providing coverage for these episodes. Medical
malpractice and auto-insurance are examples of these policies.87 Through
this insurance structure, policyholders, who may have otherwise been barred
from coverage because of their probable harm-generating activity, could still
receive coverage. To illustrate, assume a surgeon performs a lifesaving
treatment on a patient knowing that this procedure has a high probability of
failure and can trigger harmful side effects. Absent a specialized policy that
provides coverage for expected harm, the surgeon’s conduct will be barred
from insurance protection when reviewed under the expected or intended
harm clause because she is aware of her high harm-generating probability.
The third vehicle to address significant lapses is through the
common law of torts, which excuses certain non-compliant injurers from
liability. Negligence law carves out groups that are expected to take fewer
Cir. 1985) (suggesting that purchasing insurance can incentivize the insured
to “take more risks than before because he bears less of the cost of his
conduct.”); Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability
Insurance, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 313, 338 n.117 (1990) (“‘Moral hazard’
is sometimes distinguished from ‘morale hazard,’ the former referring to
deliberate acts like arson, the latter to the mere relaxation of the defendant’s
discipline of carefulness.”); George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis
and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1547 (1987) (“Ex ante moral
hazard is the reduction in precautions taken by the insured to prevent the
loss, because of the existence of insurance”).
87
These specialized policies are also characterized by certain
governmental regulation. These regulations create external incentives for
insurers to provide insurance for policyholders that can potentially cause
great harm. Examples include tort reform and the cap on medical malpractice
damages and the requirement for mandatory Automobile Insurance Policy.
See ABRAHAM, supra note 7, at 281–95.
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precautions.88 Children, the elderly, and individuals with disabilities, for
example, are consistently assessed against a lower standard of care.89 In the
context of coverage forfeiture, negligence doctrines protect these individuals
so that even highly probable risk-generating behavior may not be classified
as negligent. This exception occurs when the injurer is part of a recognized
sub-group that has traditionally been evaluated under a lower standard, and
she meets this standard notwithstanding her harm’s high probability. In this
way, negligence law shields certain groups from suspended coverage since
their liability threshold is already set at an exceptionally high standard.
Finally, coverage may be regained from conduct with a substantial
probability of harm if the injurer took actions to mitigate her risk. Several
courts advance this idea by allowing recovery if the defendant attempted to
reduce her risk. For example, in Potomac Ins. of Ill. v. Jonson Huang,90 the
court found that when the defendant “took proactive measures to repair and
replace the leaky windows in a sincere attempt to avoid recurrent incidents
of the same nature…[he] fully hoped and expected that its remedial efforts
would prevent subsequent incidents of the same nature.” 91 By reducing the
likelihood of occurrence or recurrence, preventative measures insulate the
injurer from expecting subsequent accidents. As a result, when an injurer
knows her conduct has a substantial probability of causing harm and she
takes measures to lessen it, then the risk’s manifestation should legally be
considered “unexpected.”
While the aforementioned approaches may reduce the adverse
effects of the “substantial probability” test, insurance companies can offer a
superior solution. Foremost, insurers can adjust their policy language away
from expected harm—a “substantial probability” inquiry— and towards
assessing the magnitude of harm—a “substantial risk” examination. Under
this new focus, courts can determine that an injurer’s conduct was
“expected” when her action produced a substantial risk of harm regardless
of its occurrence probability.
Although colloquially similar, “substantial probability” and
“substantial risk” evaluate different factors, and thus result in disparate
outcomes. Unlike “substantial probability” which measures chance,
“substantial risk” concerns the degree of risk. We can conceptualize this
88

Ben-Shahar & Porat, supra note 33, at 636–41.
ABRAHAM, supra note 7, at 64–67.
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Potomac Ins. of Ill. v. Jonson Huang, No. 00-4013-JPO, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 4710, at *25 (D. Kan. Mar. 1, 2002).
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See also Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc., v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Grp., 343 F. Supp. 2d 989 (D. Kan. 2004).
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distinction in economic terms, where substantial risk is the probability of
harm multiplied by the accident cost. This is its main advantage: a
“substantial risk” approach provides courts with a calculation for measuring
probability. For example, a 5% marginal increase in probability (from 2% to
7%) for $2 billion in environmental damages can be a substantial risk even
though generally a 7% probability of harm may seem low. Absent this
“substantial risk” computation, courts are left with arbitrary line-drawing.
The arbitrariness problem is not present in a “substantial risk” examination
since courts can weigh the resulting harm against the activity’s benefits.
While “substantial risk” solves the computation problem, this
approach has limitations and may fail to differentiate unintentional noncompliance and intentional negligent risk-taking when unintentional
activities generate substantial risks. One way to conceptualize this outcome
is by grouping “risk” into three categories: compliance, ordinary, and
substantial. An injurer who conforms with the standard of care only imposes
a compliance risk—a risk injurers can legally inflict without being liable for
the resulting harm. However, both ordinary and substantial risk suggest some
deviation from the standard of care. In order for an injurer’s harm to be
expected, a “substantial risk” examination requires her risk be substantial in
magnitude, not just likelihood.
One disadvantage of the “substantial risk” approach is that it ignores
activities that diverge from the typical correlation that increased precautions
reduce accident costs. In fact, small lapses may lead to an enormous increase
in an accident’s probability or the risk level. For example, assume that
physicians lapse randomly when analyzing their patients’ test results. A
physician’s slight misreading may have larger implications in the future if
her mistake prevents an early cancer diagnosis. When courts use “substantial
risk” to estimate a harm’s “substantial probability,” then unintentional noncomplaint injurers are barred from coverage when small lapses produce a
large increase in risk.
In sum, courts currently use the “substantial probability” test to
determine whether coverage should be barred when the injurer knew about
her risk. This test provides a good mechanism to infer knowledge since
courts can cite to an injurer’s awareness of substantial probability as
evidence that her harm was expected. However, despite this advantage, this
test lacks a reliable computation method for courts to determine what degree
of certainty amounts to a “substantial probability.” This shortcoming can
sometimes be mitigated through injurer awareness of unintentional noncompliance, specialty policies, the common law of torts, and restorative
efforts. Yet such solutions are not guaranteed. In response, insurers may be
wise to adopt a different assessment approach by drafting their insurance
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policies to bar coverage for harm with a “substantial risk” rather than harm
with a substantial probability of occurring. This shift in evaluation is better
aligned with efficiency considerations because it provides courts a more
reliable computation to measure expected harm. Although offering important
advantages when compared to the “substantial probability” test, the
“substantial risk” test has its own imperfections, which can lead courts to bar
coverage for unintentional non-compliance since the “substantial risk”
knowledge requirement is also vulnerable to misclassification. This outcome
is described further in Section III.C.1.
IV.

OPTIMAL INTERPRETATION

The expected or intended harm clause allows insurance companies
to differentiate between bad moral luck and intentional negligent risk-taking.
Due to interpretive imperfection, courts undermine this aim when assessing
subjective expectation and substantial probability. To mitigate this problem,
this article recommends adding a best efforts component92 to the “expected”
harm analysis where injurers are evaluated according to their personal
abilities. By rejecting the Carter Lake objective approach and refining the
Johnstown subjective standard, the best efforts test provides a more reliable
way to distinguish intentional non-compliance. With an enhanced
mechanism for identifying “expected” harm, courts can more consistently
interpret the expected and intended harm clause to exclude coverage for
intentional negligent risk-taking, without also barring unintentional noncompliance. At this core, the best efforts test shifts the inquiry from a
knowledge-oriented analysis (what did the injurer know?) to a behaviororiented analysis (how did the injurer act?). The following sections detail
this test’s advantages, the need for shifting the burden of proof, and possible
criticisms.

92

The best efforts test suggested in this article is similar to the Second
Order Precaution defense that has been suggested in the context of
negligence law. See Cooter & Porat, supra note 33; However, the Second
Order Precautions defense raises certain problems in the context of
negligence, such as the problem of proving causation, which the authors
note, id. at 355–56. There is no causation problem in the insurance policy
context. Additionally, there is no problem of costing shifting to the victim, a
party that usually cannot contract with the injurer, rather to the insurer a party
that have contracted with the insurer. Hence, inefficiencies in cost shifting
could be solved contractually between the parties.
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DETERMINING WHAT IS “BEST”?

A critical component of the best efforts test is how to measure
“best.” While an injurer’s actual efforts provide insight into intentionality,
this criterion can be over-inclusive because it also captures minimal risktaking that appears unintentional. To avoid this problem, the legal test must
ensure that an injurer’s efforts represent her best precautionary measures, not
just her actual precautionary measures. Defining “best” implicates both
practicality and fairness concerns. Regarding practicality, injurers must be
able to meet the standard of care notwithstanding their imperfections. In
terms of fairness, only efforts that surpass a higher threshold should qualify
as “best” compared to any generic effort.
In applying a best efforts test, courts should evaluate an injurer’s
negligent behavior against her ordinary conduct in order to establish a
subjective standard of care. To accomplish this analysis, courts must
examine the injurer’s behavior over an extended period of time before the
accident—an approach which deviates from traditional tort doctrine by
considering previous compliance. For instance, an injurer with a speeding
infraction would be assessed against her past driving record. A medical
malpractice claim would invite examination into the physician’s records.
Pollution would trigger research into a factory’s historical handling of its
toxins. By evaluating an injurer’s previous actions, courts can learn a great
deal about her ordinary behavior and see how her negligent conduct
compares. If an injurer maintains a strong record of previous compliance,
then it is more likely her harm resulted from unintentional non-compliance.
The inverse is also true where frequent substantial deviations suggest
intentional negligent risk-taking. Revisiting Carter Lake assume the
municipality provided evidence of: (1) their timely response to previous
complaints; and (2) a record of answered complaints. If the court believes,
the municipality’s behavior did not fall substantially below its ordinary
conduct, then such conduct does not indicate a lack of “best” efforts, and
thus a defense should stand as the case does not constitute intentional
negligent risk-taking, and vice versa.
A likely criticism to the best efforts test is that it incentivizes injurers
to reduce their ordinary precautions, so their subjective standard is also
lowered. While a valid concern, mitigating factors within the insurance
industry counteract this problem, especially premiums. Insurance policies
undergo an underwriting process in which the insurance company
determines the injurer’s level of risk. Lowering one’s best efforts standard to
qualify for ex-post coverage can increase the insurance premium ex ante. In
fact, in some cases, applicants with high ordinary risk may not be able to
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obtain insurance at all. To counteract higher premiums, injurers will show
they do not pose a risky investment and have exceptional “best efforts.”
Having presented this narrative to capitalize on lower premiums, the injurer
will be foreclosed from later arguing that her best efforts comport to a lower
standard. Given these counterbalancing factors, an injurer’s best efforts will
correlate to the standard initially presented and captured by the policy
premium.
Another criticism of the best efforts test is that it incentivizes
insurance companies to require timely updates of injurer behavior. While a
potential administrative inconvenience, this byproduct is not necessarily a
disadvantage. If the injurer and insurer both know that “best efforts” includes
behavior captured by the policy and premium, then each party will be
incentivized to provide the other with periodic information. Injurers will be
motived to submit their information because a record of compliance
safeguards against “expected” harm claims. Similarly, insurers have an
interest in receiving this information, which would normally not be shared,
so they can update their policy terms and premiums.
Thus far, we have examined the best efforts test through the injurer’s
representations, but policy warranties also serve as a reliable “best” effort
proxy since they reveal the injurer’s guarantees. No legal rule prevents
parties from incorporating the injurer’s subjective standard of behavior into
the insurance policy as a form of warranty. For example, an insurer may
require a factory to pledge its compliance with its own rules regarding
hazardous material handling. In response, the factory is incentivized to create
rules that are not too strict to facilitate easy compliance but also not too
lenient, which will increase the premium price. As such, when insurance
policies use a subjective standard, they provide courts a better rubric to
measure the injurer’s conduct.
B.

BURDEN OF PROOF – BEST EFFORTS AS A DEFENSE

In order to bar coverage, the insurance company bears the burden of
proof.93 To satisfy its burden, the insurer must prove that the injurer had (1)
93

Johanna Hjalmarsson, The Standard of Proof in Civil Cases: An
Insurance Fraud Perspective, 17 INT'L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 47, 48 (2013);
William C. Hoffman, Common Law of Reinsurance Loss Settlement Clauses:
A Comparative Analysis of the Judicial Rule Enforcing the Reinsurer's
Contractual Obligation to Indemnify the Reinsured for Settlements, 28 TORT
& INS. L.J. 659, 698–99 (1993).
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subjective knowledge that there was (2) a substantial probability of harm.94
Once the insurer satisfies these two elements, the best efforts test can be used
as a defense, rather than an independent claim. The best efforts test is
optimally situated as a defense for several reasons. First, this test assesses
the injurer’s culpability, competence, and behavior—all information within
the injurer’s possession.95 As such, it is efficient to assign the injurer the
burden of proof because her superior access to this information and high
level of reliability makes her the cheapest information gatherer.96 Moreover,
as the above discussion revealed, the underwriting process discourages
injurers from lying about their best efforts because their premiums reflect
their capacities.
Second, assigning the burden of proof to the insurance company
creates a conflict of interest. Rational injurers will not provide best efforts
evidence when it is lacking because they will lose coverage. If the insurance
company fails to satisfy its burden of proof because of insufficient evidence,
then coverage will be granted regardless of whether the injurer exercised her
best efforts. In this way, the injurer is incentivized to keep deficient best
effort evidence secret since she benefits when the insurance company cannot
prove this element. This result bolsters the broad subjective test’s overinclusiveness because any mitigating effect becomes marginal.
Third, employing a best efforts defense lowers litigation costs. A
defense is triggered when courts rule that the expected or intended harm
clause exclusion applies. As such, in cases where the court finds no
exclusion, the best efforts test is superfluous because failure to meet the first
two conditions—subjective knowledge and substantial probability—is fatal.
Conversely, when the injurer believes she has a strong best efforts defense,
then parties can litigate this question first. If the court finds for the injurer,
then the “expected” harm inquiry becomes secondary since the injurer took
her best precautions. For these reasons, a best efforts defense is optimal
because the injurer possesses the necessary information and is incentivized
to use it in her defense. Moreover, this defense saves litigation costs because
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Compare with the current requirement for substantial probability
supra Part III.C.2.
95
Ben-Shahar & Porat, supra note 33.
96
Similar argument made in the context of contractual disclosure, see
Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of
Contracts, 7 J. LEG. STUD. 1, 4 (1978) (“[A] court concerned with economic
efficiency should impose the risk on the better information gatherer”).
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it is only implicated when the exclusion applies at which point it can be
litigated first.
C.

DISTINGUISHING “BEST EFFORTS” FROM SECOND ORDER
PRECAUTIONS

This article’s best efforts test parallels Robert Cooter and Ariel
Porat’s Second Order Precautions defense in negligence law.97 Cooter and
Porat recommend that First Order Precautions, those actually taken by the
defendant and affect the likelihood of accident, should be distinguished from
Second Order Precautions, “behavior that changes the probability
distribution over first-order precaution.”98 It is important to distinguish the
best efforts test from Second Order Precautions because while they may
seem to overlap they maintain material differences.
First, Second Order Precautions are used to determine negligence
and, therefore, affect litigation between injurers and victims.99 Conversely,
the best efforts test applies to disputes between injurers and insurers, so it
does not directly impact victims and their precaution incentives. Second,
self-control grounds Second Order Precautions, which injurers can continue
managing even if they lapse when taking First Order Precautions.100
Employing Cooter and Porat’s hypothetical,101 a driver might not always
control her speed, but she can always glance at her speedometer. Straying
from Second Order Precautions, the best efforts test takes a broader approach
assuming that injurers can lapse when controlling their speed and when
deciding how frequently to consult their speedometer. In this way, both
actions are unintentional lapses under the best efforts test.
Third, Second Order Precautions presume an individual’s capacities,
which de facto applies an objective standard.102 The best efforts test rejects
this objective standard in favor of a personalized rubric constructed from the
injurer’s characteristics and competencies. Under an objective analysis,
evidence of the injurer’s best efforts is marginally significant because the
standard is measured against the reasonable person. For instance, an injurer’s
97
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See Cooter & Porat, supra note 33, at 330.
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See Cooter & Porat, supra note 33, at 330–31.
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exceptional driving record has no bearing on a speeding case. Similarly, a
factory that pollutes hazardous chemicals beyond the legally permitted limit
cannot introduce evidence of prior compliance. These outcomes are
undesirable because they treat defendants as intentional negligent risk-takers
when their harm could also plausibly result from unintentional noncompliance. As such, this objective approach underutilizes valuable
information that the best efforts test prioritizes.103 Relevant inquiries under
the best efforts test include: does the driver speed regularly, and if so, what
is her degree of deviation? Did the factory comply with its own internal
rules? All these questions try to assess whether the injurer’s non-compliance
was unintentional by measuring her conduct against her ordinary behavior.
Constant deviations or repeated high-risk activities indicate intentional noncompliance whereas infrequent episodes or small deviations suggest
unintentional non-compliance.
Finally, the best efforts test does not face the same evidentiary
hurdles as Second Order Precautions.104 Since the latter is a defense within
negligence law, it often confronts problems with proving causation.105 In
some cases, it is almost impossible to prove that Second Order Precautions
could have prevented an accident. To illustrate, a driver looking at her
speedometer takes a Second Order Precaution because her action reduces her
distribution of lapses. However, proving that another glance at the
speedometer would have prevented her accident is a herculean task given its
hypothetical nature.106 Within the insurance context, where the best efforts
test operates, this causation problem does not exist. The expected or intended
harm clause renders additional precautions irrelevant since it is the injurer’s
intention that matters most. Thus, although the best efforts test seems to
overlap with Second Order Precautions, they diverge significantly. While
Second Order Precautions provide a theoretical framework from which the
best efforts test borrows, the latter is further tailored to meet the efficiency
concerns within insurance.
D.

APPLICATION OF THE BEST EFFORTS TEST

To evaluate the best efforts test’s force, it is important to consider
how courts would apply it in interpreting the expected or intended harm
clause. When an injurer’s expectation is interpreted narrowly so to require
103
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actual knowledge of a substantial probability of risk, then the best efforts test
is insignificant. There is no need to assess an individual’s best efforts if
courts exclude coverage only for intentional actions. Thus, if an injurer
intended to engage in negligent behavior, then she did not exercise her best
efforts to conform with the standard of care.
While inapplicable in these scenarios, the best efforts test becomes
valuable for courts engaging in a broad subjective analysis where the injurer
possesses knowledge of harm but lacks the capacity to avoid it. This test also
proves beneficial in cases where objective evidence leads courts to infer
subjective (constructive) knowledge as a matter of law.107 Thus, the central
inquiry grounding the best efforts test under a subjective analysis is whether
the injurer exercised sufficient care to yield the lowest accident cost given
her idiosyncratic characteristics.
A review of Harleysville Worcester Ins. Co. v. Paramount
Concrete108 reveals how the best efforts test would operate. In Harleysville
Worcester, a concrete factory faced charges for producing defective concrete
that caused severe damage to the pools in which it was used. In its opinion,
the court concluded that the factory “lacked an effective quality control
system, its management lacked experience with concrete, and its batch man
did not feel adequately trained. Those issues point to severe deficiencies in
Paramount’s operations and were enough for the jury to find that it acted
recklessly.”109 However, the court ruled, that even if the jury found the
company’s behavior reckless, the harm was not “expected” under a
subjective standard of injurer intent. It continued, “But [the plaintiffs] d[id]
not prove that the relevant individuals at Paramount actually knew, much less
intended, that the shotcrete was so defective it could cause harm.” Such
language highlights the court’s reliance on a narrow subjective test where
harm is “expected” if the injurer intends or has knowledge of an accident’s
possibility.
However, if the Harleysville Worcester court adopted a broad
subjective interpretation, then the factory’s incompetence could satisfy the
subjective knowledge requirement for “expected” harm. To this extent, the
factory’s management knew it lacked the necessary knowledge about its
product and maintained inferior quality-control technology compared to the
rest of the industry. Using a broad Carter Lake approach, the court could
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See supra note 82.
Harleysville Worcester Ins. Co. v. Paramount Concrete, 123 F. Supp.
3d 282 (D. Conn. 2015).
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reasonably conclude that the factory’s management knew or should have
known about the risk their product imposed.
If this outcome occurred, then the best efforts test would trigger,
thereby allowing the factory to present evidence that the management team
exercised its best efforts given their limited expertise and resources. Having
examined the factory’s best efforts evidence, the court could decide that the
harm was “unexpected” and thus entitled to coverage. Courts would not be
able to achieve this outcome if they applied a Carter Lake construction of
knowledge and conducted a “substantial probability” inquiry because the
factory’s best efforts would be irrelevant in these assessments.
Similar to the Harleysville Worcester counterfactual, Carter Lake
would also result in a different outcome if we applied the best efforts test.
Unlike the former, the Carter Lake municipality was aware of their failing
sewage system and knew, or should have known, that there was a substantial
probability for a second flood.110 Despite this knowledge and the foreseeable
probability of a heightened flood risk, the municipality did not act to prevent
future accidents.111 The municipality’s conduct clearly illustrates a failure to
exercise its best efforts. With no evidence of alternative precautions, the
court would find the municipality’s harm “expected” and thus not a result of
unintentional non-compliance. Once identified as “expected” harm, the
municipality’s conduct would be excluded from coverage.
The best efforts test does not distort the outcome in Carter Lake. The
municipality forfeited its insurance coverage by engaging in intentional
negligent risk-taking because it failed to take efforts to mitigate their risk.112
110

Carter Lake v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 604 F.2d 1052, 1059 (8th Cir.
1979) (“the probability of an identical equipment failure and consequential
flooding of the [plaintiff’s] basement on a particular day was relatively
slight, about 2% With hindsight. However, there was clearly a substantial
probability of another backup at some time caused by an identical equipment
failure if the equipment was not replaced or an alarm system installed”).
111
Id. (“Nevertheless, Carter Lake took the calculated risk that such
backup would not occur,and elected to continue operations without
correcting its methods”).
112
Id. (“Once the city was alerted to the problem, its cause, and the
likelihood of reoccurrence, it could not ignore the problem and then look to
Aetna to reimburse it for the liability incurred by reason of such inaction.
[internal citation omitted] Once the city was alerted to the problem, its cause,
and the likelihood of reoccurrence, it could not ignore the problem and then
look to Aetna to reimburse it for the liability incurred by reason of such
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Had the municipality engaged in good-faith yet unsuccessful efforts to
prevent the accident, it is likely the court would have found the harm
“unexpected.” In fact, courts have often found no expectation of harm when
injurers attempt to take sufficient care, even if those precautions are
insufficient.113 For example, in Aetna CA’s. & Sur. Co. v. Dow Chem. Co.,114
the court, as a matter of law, found that the injurer did not expect the
magnitude of contamination despite knowing the disposed materials’
hazardous nature. Instead, the court held that the injurer took sufficiently
reasonable precautions to mitigate the possible harm.115 In other words, the
injurer exercised her best efforts to lessen the risk; therefore, shifting the
inquiry from an examination of knowledge to an examination of behavior.
Aetna suggests that, in certain cases, some courts cannot adequately assess
knowledge and so turn to examining the injurer’s behavior. As such, this case
illustrates how examining conduct can be superior to evaluating knowledge.
This article recommends that by adding this third prong—the best efforts
test—courts can more consistently interpret the expected or intended harm
clause to exclude intentional negligent risk-taking but not unintentional noncompliance. Ultimately, the best efforts test achieves more efficient
outcomes.
The best efforts test is also operative under the court’s “substantial
probability” inquiry. A behavior-based examination can reveal the
probability of harm an injurer imposes over time given her idiosyncratic
characteristics. When an injurer’s behavior creates a sudden unexplained
increase in the probability of harm, her conduct will be classified as
“expected” in comparison to her smaller deviations. Inversely, when the
injurer’s harm-generating behavior aligns with her ordinary deviations and
this risk is incorporated in her insurance policy, then the injurer may keep
her coverage under the best efforts test despite her conduct’s “substantial
probability” since this is the risk she was underwritten.
Alternatively, if insurers decide to adopt the more efficient
“substantial risk” test, the best efforts test still offers relief for the
misclassification problem. Under this recommended approach, the insurance
company could underwrite the injurer for a certain risk range. Over time, the
risk will increase and decrease due to the injurer’s limited cognitive capacity
inaction”).
113
See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text. See also FISCHER,
WIDISS & KEETON, supra note 53at 442–43.
114
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to constantly comply with the standard of care. Any sudden unexplained or
unexcused deviation triggered by the injurer’s risky behavior would provide
evidence that the injurer did not exercise her best efforts. Conversely, when
a substantial risk materializes but remains within the risk range incorporated
into the underwriting process, then the injurer’s conduct can be covered. In
this way, whether insurers continue to use a “substantial probability” inquiry
or shift to a “substantial risk” approach, the best efforts test offers a good
mechanism to address the activity misclassification problem which occurs
under both tests.
E.

BEST EFFORTS TEST AND THE INSURTECH LANDSCAPE

Acquiring the injurer’s behavior information demands a significant
investment in the underwriting process and an ongoing examination,
requirements that may seem impractical. However, like many other
commercial vendors, the insurance industry is experiencing radical
innovations in technology which may improve such information gathering
both in accuracy and efficiency. These technological changes within the
insurance industry have led to the emergence of a new market—InsurTech.
In recent years, the traditional insurance industry has transformed as
new insurers emerge and incumbent companies offer innovative services. In
particular, these actors and services aim to incorporate technological
advancements into various aspects of the insurance industry. For example,
some web-based insurance providers sell policies for accidents that have not
traditionally been protected in the insurance market, such as a flight delay
policy or a cracked screen policy.116 These new policies signal insurers’
enhanced abilities to assess risk and offer better coverage against high-risk
behaviors and events. One way providers achieve this service is by engaging
in an advanced underwriting process,117 such as the Big-Data-based
underwriting procedure.118 Other insurers incorporate behavioral
economics119 into the underwriting process to structure policies and set
116

Don Weinland & Oliver Ralph, ZhongAn launches InsurTech
concept to world, FINANCIAL TIMES (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.ft.com/
content/c9d10ada-9eb1-11e7-8cd4-932067fbf946 (In addition to these
examples, ZhongAn also offers a shipping return policy).
117
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Id. (For example, updating the policy premium according to current
weather reports).
119
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premiums through Artificial Intelligence (AI).120 These advanced
underwriting procedures rely on information gathered through mass-data121
collections from smart-phones, web searches, wearable sensors,122 and metadata, among others to make better-informed decisions about an applicant’s
risk level.123 Access to this information’s quantity and quality better
positions insurance companies to assess risk, set representations and
warranties, as well as mitigate exposure to moral hazard and fraud.
Although insurers employ different approaches, these changes to the
insurance industry maintain a commonality: they seek to reduce information
asymmetry between providers and injurers. By efficiently collecting
information about policyholders or applicants,124 providers can strategically
adjust their premiums and design more personalized insurance policies.
Currently, these advancements are most active in health and automobile
insurance,125 but we can expect growth beyond these industries due to the
numerous advantages specialization offers.
In the context of the expected or intended harm clause, we can expect
a few changes to occur simultaneously or consecutively. First, as more
10, 2017), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/lemonade-launchesinsurance-api-650210233.html.
120
Jemima Kelly & Carolyn Cohn, Insurers Hope InsurTech Will
“Nudge” Customers to Less Risky Behaviors, INS. J. (Sept. 19, 2017), http://
www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2017/09/19/464718.htm.
121
Shanique Hall, How Artificial Intelligence is Changing the Insurance
Industry, CIPR NEWSLETTER 2, 6 (Aug. 2017), http://states.naic.org/cipr_ne
wsletter_archive/vol22.pdf.
122
Elizabeth Gurdus, UnitedHealthcare and Fitbit to pay users up to
$1,500 to use devices, CNBC (Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/01/
05/unitedhealthcare-and-fitbit-to-pay-users-up-to-1500-to-use-devices.html.
123
Kelly & Cohn, supra note 120 (For example, Telematics devices in
care which are “black boxes in cars which enable insurers to check
customers’ driving and reward safer habits.”). See also Tyler Tappendorf,
Five InsurTech Trends and What They Mean for Microinsurance,
MICROFINANCE GATEWAY (Feb. 2017), https://www.microfinancegateway.
org/blog/2017/feb/five-insuretech-trends-and-what-they-mean-microinsura
nce.
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Russ Banham, Investing in the InsurTech Toolbox, RISK MGMT. (June
1, 2017), http://www.rmmagazine.com/2017/06/01/investing-in-the-insurtec
h-toolbox/.
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information about the injurer is available, unintentional non-compliance will
be more predictable. Insurers will know promptly, through constant data
collection, when a policyholder fails to meet an objective standard, thus
transforming the underwriting process from a preliminary step to an ongoing
examination.126 Access to this information will also impact the best efforts
test as judges shift from a theoretical exercise of determining “best” efforts
to a more technical regression analysis.
Second, this enhanced approach will also enable insurers to more
easily and accurately evaluate an injurer’s risk-taking intentions. With access
to the injurer’s private records, providers can create a baseline of their
policyholder’s ordinary behavior. Using this metric, providers can observe
an injurer’s conduct for deviations with frequent episodes suggesting
intentional negligent risk-taking and prior compliance indicating
unintentional incompliance. 127
V.

CONCLUSION

Negligent defendants do not comply with the standard of care for
one of two reasons. First, an injurer may wish to engage in intentional
negligent risk-taking even if she is capable of meeting the standard. In this
case, she has taken a calculated risk that an accident will not occur and has
proceeded under this probability. Second, injurers may act negligently
despite exercising their best efforts because of lapses, failures to meet the
objective standard, and res ipsa loquitor. This article classifies the latter
category as unintentional non-compliance.128 When insurance policies can
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Hall, supra note 121, at 6. Gurdus, supra note 122.
As policies become more individualized, the expected or intended
harm clause will slowly lose its applicability since insurers will prefer
specific contractual provisions to general “basket” clauses. For a review of
personally tailored policies see Matt Cullen, InsureTech Firms Look to
Disrupt, but not to Overtake Incumbents, LSE BUS. REV. (Jun. 14, 2016),
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/2016/06/14/insuretech-firms-look-todisrupt-but-not-to-overtakeincumbents/.
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This article does not conceptualize intentional negligent risk-taking
as bad moral luck because under those circumstances the decision to engage
in negligence is deliberate. The fortuitous element is the accident – the
materialization of the risk. Hence, in my view, intentional risk-takers suffer
from bad luck generally rather than bad moral luck.
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bar coverage for the first injurer but not the latter, then we achieve an optimal
result.
One mechanism that insurance policies can use to distinguish these
two injurer-types is the expected or intended harm clause, which bars
coverage when an injurer expects her conduct will cause harm. Courts
disagree on what constitutes “expected” or “intended” harm.129 Some
jurisdictions require that the injurer has a subjective expectation130 that harm
has a substantial probability of occurring while other require an objective
one.131 These two approaches represent the most common interpretations of
the expected or intended harm clause exclusion. Most courts also require that
the accident’s probability be particularly high.132
Both these approaches have limitations, imperfections, and
tradeoffs. On the one hand, an explicit knowledge inquiry solves the problem
of bad moral luck but allows coverage for intentional negligent risk-taking
when subjective awareness evidence is difficult to obtain.133 On the other
hand, when courts require a subjective expectation of harm, bad moral luck
may be barred from coverage.134 Given human error, it is inevitable that
injurers will sometimes engage in unintentional non-compliance that cannot
be mitigated.135 The substantial probability test, which bars coverage for
accidents with a high probability of expected harm may help alleviate this
problem but will not resolve it.136
The best efforts test provides a valuable tool for courts to efficiently
distinguish between intentional and unintentional non-compliance.
Formulating this test as a defense correctly incentivizes parties to supply
important information as evidence, which ultimately saves litigation costs.
This test also faces its own limitations and constraints. First, information
about the injurer’s best efforts may not be available. Second, the study of
lapses and limited cognitive capacity is still evolving, leaving many
questions unanswered in this area. Nevertheless, as legal and behavioral
research continues to develop, we can gain additional insights into
addressing these problems in tort law. Finally, further research may also
129

See supra Part III.C.
See supra note 75.
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See supra notes 70 and 74.
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See supra notes 74–75. See also FISCHER, WIDISS & KEETON, supra
note 53 at 435–37.
133
See supra Part III.C.1.
134
See supra Part III.C.1.
135
See supra Part III.C.1.
136
See supra Part III.C.2.
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prove beneficial in determining whether applying the best efforts test is
justified from an efficiency or fairness perspective in other areas of the law,
including contracts, criminal law, and administrative law. In these fields,
using the best efforts test to assess the injurer’s capability may yield different
and superior results than those produced by the objective tests currently
employed.

